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This study examines the influence of the quality of voluntary disclosure (QVD) on earnings 
management (EM) among a sample of commercial banks in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region.   
Design/methodology/approach  
Using a sample of 1,060 bank-year observations for the period 2006–2015, we developed a 
three-dimensional framework to measure the QVD, which considers the quantity, spread and 
usefulness of the information. Furthermore, this study examines the QVD-EM nexus 
employing an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model. This technique is supplemented 
with conducting an instrumental variable (IV) regression model and a two-stage least squares 
(2 SLS) model to overcome the potential occurrence of endogeneity problems.  
Findings  
Our findings suggest that QVD is negatively attributed to EM in the context of MENA banks. 
The findings also confirm that the quality of financial reporting is enhanced by QVD 
dimensions that were considered in our framework, leading banks to less engagement in EM 
practices. In contrast, the influence of the quantity dimension (level) of the disclosed 
information has an insignificant impact on EM, while the spread and usefulness dimensions of 
voluntary disclosure (VD) are negatively and significantly associated with EM in the region. 
Originality/value  
Our study distinctively develops an innovative measurement for QVD using a new 
multidimensional model. We also bring new evidence on QVD complexity and its impact on 
EM practice from an under-researched developing context, namely the MENA region.  
Keywords Earnings Management, Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions, Quality of Voluntary 
Disclosure, the MENA region 





The recent financial crisis has shown the insufficiency of the information disclosed by financial 
firms and their high level of asymmetric information. For example, the bankruptcies of Lehman 
Brothers were due to poor financial reporting quality, which misled users, causing them to 
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make inaccurate decisions (Jones and Finley, 2011). The failure of these firms has placed 
additional pressure on professional-standard 'setters' bodies and listed firms to raise the quality 
of disclosures (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008). The information asymmetry between managers 
and owners may occur when managers opportunistically use earnings manipulations to 
maximize their interests, leading to poor financial reporting quality, which decreases 
shareholders’ confidence in the disclosed information (Cai, Li, and Tang, 2020; Bigus and 
Häfele, 2018). 
Previous EM studies (e.g., Alzoubi, 2016; Katmon and Al Farooque, 2017; Rezaee and Tuo, 
2019; Suteja, Gunardi and Mirawati, 2016) suggested that EM is classified into either 
opportunistic or informative behaviour. In opportunistic behaviour, managers mislead 
investors to protect their reputation and secure more remuneration. In contrast, from an 
informative perspective, managers might disclose more relevant information to the investors. 
Distinguishing between informative practice and opportunistic behaviour is not easy without 
considering managerial incentives to manipulate earnings figures.  
Although a considerable body of prior studies examined the impact of voluntary disclosure 
(VD) on EM (Katmon and Al Farooque, 2017; Rezaee and Tuo, 2019; Suteja et al., 2016), 
there is still an existing gap in the literature related to the measurement of VD. When examining 
the relationship between VD and EM, two VD measurement methods have been used. The first 
method used the level and quantity of the disclosed information to measure VD. However, this 
method neglects some important dimensions, such as the spread and usefulness of VD that 
distinguish the disclosed information. The second method uses subjective analyst disclosure 
quality rankings (Francis, Nanda and Olsson, 2008; Husted and De Sousa-Filho, 2018; 
Muttakin, Khan and Azim, 2015; Sun and Rath, 2010). Such indices may not be widely 
applicable for availability and transparency reasons (Chatterji et al., 2009).  
The motivations of this study are two-fold. Firstly, we go beyond previous studies that ignore 
the effect of spread and usefulness dimensions in measuring QVD (Alotaibi and Hussainey, 
2016; Alturki, 2014; Francis, Nanda and Olsson, 2008; Habbash, Hussainey, and Awad, 2016; 
Lobo and Zhou, 2001; Muttakin et al., 2015). Therefore, we contribute to the existing body of 
literature by developing a comprehensive framework that considers three dimensions (i.e., 
quantity, spread and usefulness) to captures the QVD and examine the QVD-EM nexus. 
Secondly, to date, a study examining the impact of VD on EM in the banking sector is virtually 
non-existent. The extant literature of the influence of voluntary disclosure on earnings 
management provides inconsistent outcomes. For instance, Katmon and Al Farooque (2017) 
found that VD is negatively associated with EM. Conversely, Prior et al. (2008) have reported 
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that VD is positively associated with EM. This paper, therefore, addresses this gap by 
examining the VD-EM nexus using a dataset that has been manually collected from commercial 
banks operating in the MENA region. This also brings a new perspective leading to a unique 
contribution to QVD and EM literature.  
This paper investigates the extent to which the QVD and EM are statistically and theoretically 
correlated. Theoretically, managers may voluntarily disclose high-quality voluntary 
information to mitigate information asymmetry further to signalling their superior performance 
to those interested in their information (Miller, 2002). Hypothetically, it is expected that 
managers who voluntarily release high-quality information are unlikely to engage in earnings 
manipulation. Since high information asymmetry is likely to result in EM practice, the QVD is 
assumed to mitigate the information gap between agent and principle. Thus, QVD is considered 
as a vital instrument to monitor executive’ opportunistic behaviour and constrain the incidence 
of EM practice (Bushman and Smith, 2001). Furthermore, the magnitude of EM is less likely 
to be correlated to the level of VD, which implies a compensatory relationship, meaning that 
firms with poor quality disclosures might attempt to gain legitimacy by disseminating more 
information voluntarily to compensate stakeholders for the inadequacy of the disclosed 
information (Rodríguez‐Ariza et al., 2017).  
In our study, we use a sample of 106 commercial banks listed in 17 MENA stock exchanges 
covering a ten year period. Our study employed loan loss provisions (LLP), which is widely 
used in the banking industry as the main tool for managing EM (Kwak et al., 2009; Leventis et 
al., 2012). The extent of LLP for each sample firm-year was estimated using Kanagaretnam et 
al. (2004) model. Our empirical findings suggested that banks that provide high QVD appeared 
to be less engaged in EM. Additionally, we found no evidence on the association between the 
quantity (level) of VD and EM in the MENA region.  
Our study makes the following contributions. First, prior VD-to-EM studies were confined to 
examining the relationship between the level of VD and EM (i.e., Katmon and Al Farooque, 
2017; Rezaee and Tuo, 2019; Suteja et al., 2016). Our study, therefore, extends the body of 
previous literature by considering the collective effect of VD quality and quantity on the 
engagement in earnings manipulation in the banking sector. To achieve this objective, we 
develop a three-dimensional framework to measure the QVD. This framework takes into 
consideration the quantity, spread and usefulness of the information disclosed voluntarily, 
which is regarded as the most comprehensive proxy for disclosure quality. This allows for in-
depth descriptions of the patterns and the nature of the disclosed information.  
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Second, while previous studies have documented that the information asymmetry levels among 
non-financial institutions are very high (Alotaibi and Hussainey, 2016; Mersni and Othman, 
2016; Moumen et al., 2016), there is still an insufficient substantiation on the effect of VD on 
EM in the banking sector. Thus, we fill this gap by using data from commercial banks operating 
in 17 MENA countries. Also, our paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study to offer 
springboard of the relation between QVD and EM in the financial services sector. Third, we 
also extend the recent work of Alotaibi and Hussainey (2016), Mersni and Othman (2016), and 
Moumen et al. (2016) on earnings manipulation and voluntary disclosure by providing new 
evidence about the effect of QVD on EM in emerging economy context. Our findings are 
expected to assist regulators, policy-makers, market participants, and academics in 
appreciating the function and the importance of QVD dimensions in mitigating EM.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section two develops the theoretical framework 
and literature review, while Section three describes the research method used. Next, in the 
finding section, the main results, additional analysis, and robustness tests are outlined. The 
final section presents the main discussion, implications, and limitations. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Prior literature considered EM as a form of agency cost since directors engage in opportunistic 
behaviours by providing inaccurate information that does not reflect the firm’s economic 
reality (e.g., Kwak et al., 2009; Leventis et al., 2012; Othman and Mersni, 2014). The issue of 
information asymmetry allows managers to manipulate earnings to gain personal benefits since 
their compensation might directly depend on the reported results. It might also increase job 
security at shareholder's expense  (Alzoubi, 2016; Chong et al., 2012; Darjezi, 2016). In the 
banking industry, considerable discussion and criticism concluded that earnings manipulation 
and executive compensation are some of the main reasons for their financial crisis from 2007 
to 2008 (Alhadab and Al-Own, 2019). 
In contrast, VD transcends mandatory disclosure requirements and represents management’s 
free choices to provide relevant information in their annual report to enable users to make 
informed decisions (Meek, Roberts, and Gray, 1995, p. 555). Two perspectives have been 
suggested by previous research to describe the impact of QVD on EM, namely, opportunistic 
and long-term perspectives. The long-term perspective enables firms to reduce information 
asymmetry and improve financial decisions in capital markets by signalling high-quality 
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information (Uyar, Kilic, and Bayyurt, 2013). Given the proposition of a positive correlation 
between EM and information asymmetry, signalling theory assumes that information 
asymmetry is mitigated by disclosing high-quality information voluntarily (Harun et al., 2020). 
Managers may avoid the issue of asymmetric information through voluntarily signalling 
credible and relevant (high-quality) information to the market (Watts and Zimmerman 1978). 
In this regard, loan loss provision (LLP) is utilised by bank’ managers as a signalling approach 
to convey a signal of conservatism and confidence about their financial strength (Ahmed et al., 
1999). Gray (2004), for example, reported that managers of highly performed and financially 
stable firms have a desire to distinguish themselves from poorly performed firms by extending 
(signals) high- quality information voluntarily to communicate successfully. 
The legitimacy theory, on the other hand, argues that firms disguise their opportunistic 
behaviour through disclosing information voluntarily (Li et al., 2012; Parvin et al., 2020). Li, 
Mangena, & Pike (2012) argued that managers might voluntarily reveal information to shade 
their opportunistic behaviour and to protect themselves against any possible reaction from 
stockholders. The view of legitimacy theory proposes that “individual actions are substantially 
related to their self-interest, and respectively individuals may rise their wealth by engaging in 
EM practices” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Consequently, this perspective suggests a 
substitutive association between EM and QVD, in the sense that VD is used as a legitimate 
mechanism to compensate for poor financial reporting quality (Francis et al., 2008; Martínez-
Ferrero et al., 2015).   
Prior studies examined the effect of VD on EM, although their results have been proven to be 
inconsistent. For example, Rezaee and Tuo (2019), Katmon and Al Farooque (2017) and 
Alzoubi (2016) found that VD is negatively associated with EM. Conversely, Kasznik (1999), 
Patten and Trompeter (2003), Prior et al. (2008) have reported contradictory evidence, as they 
found that VD is positively correlated with EM.  
Specifically, Rezaee and Tuo (2019), investigated the effect of the quality and quantity of 
governance, social and environmental disclosure on earnings management in the context of 
culture and corporate ethical value. It was found that the quantity (level) of sustainability 
disclosure in the USA non-financial firms is negatively correlated with earnings manipulations. 
They also found that the quality of sustainability disclosure strengthens the negative association 
between the sustainability level of disclosure and earnings management. In the UK context, 
however, Katmon and Al Farooque (2017), examined the influence of internal corporate 
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governance on the quality of disclosed information and earnings manipulations using three 
different indices to capture the quality of disclosure. These indices are Forward-Looking Score, 
Investor Relation Magazine Award and the analyst forecast accuracy. They conclude that all 
three proxies of disclosure quality have significantly and negatively influenced corporate 
engagement in earnings management, whereas corporate governance mechanisms seem to have 
an insignificant influence on earnings manipulations in the UK setting. In the Middle Eastern 
countries, Alzoubi (2016) investigates the relationship between internal corporate governance 
mechanism and earnings management practices among 62 companies listed on the Amman 
Stock Exchange. The study’s findings reveal that managerial ownership, external blockholder, 
institutional ownership, foreign ownership and family ownership have an inverse relationship 
with EM.  
Also,  Alzoubi (2016), has investigated the impact of the quality of disclosure on earnings 
manipulation among non-financial companies registered in the Jordanian Stack Exchange 
using the disclosure index of Beattie et al. (2004). The study points out that the quantity of 
disclosure (level) can restrain earnings manipulation, which in turn expected to improve the 
quality of annual reports in the Jordanian context. 
On the contrary, Prior et al. (2008) and Patten and Trompeter (2003), tested the association 
between earnings manipulation and corporate social responsibility (CSR) and environmental 
disclosure among non-financial firms over 26 different developed countries. These studies 
utilised a disclosure index to capture the level of disclosed information and found a positive 
relationship between earnings manipulation and corporate disclosure, which in turn negatively 
impact the companies’ financial performance.  From a managerial perspective,  this empirical 
evidence suggests that VD seemed to be employed by managers as a method to reduce firm’s 
exposure, political and social pressures (Patten and Trompeter, 2003); thus, managers might 
attempt to opportunistically disclose more information voluntarily to cover any misconduct 
such as earnings manipulation (Ullah et al., 2019). In the same manner, a study conducted by 
Kasznik (1999) aims to investigate the effect of information disclosed voluntarily on EM 
among 366 US-listed companies during the period 1987 – 1991. The study’s finding reveals 
that voluntary disclosure is positively and significantly affected EM practices. This result 
suggests that directors who are overstated earnings are very likely to shift announced earnings 
aiming to meet their anticipation. Similarly, several studies have investigated the relationship 
between the quantity of CSR and earnings manipulation on non-financial sectors (Muttakin et 
al., 2015; Prior et al., 2008; Patten and Trompeter, 2003). Their findings show that the level of 
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CSR and EM practices are positively and significantly related.  These studies confirm that 
managers who tend to publish high level of CSR are motived to practice EM.  
Prior studies appeared to have a number of limitations. First, the majority of previous VD-to-
EM studies were limited to examining the effect of the level of information provided 
voluntarily on EM practices without considering the spread and usefulness of the information 
disclosed. In this regard, Beretta & Bozzolan (2008) state that the level of VD is not the only 
approach of measuring the quality of disclosed information as considering other matters such 
as the type and variety of the disclosed items became a more dominant proxy for the quality of 
VD. In addition, Botosan (2004) asserted that the notion of QVD should be consistent with the 
conceptual framework of IFRS. This will find an acknowledged explanation of disclosure 
quality, in turn, could increase the quality of disclosed information and then enhancing 
decisions making processes (IFRS 2010). Second, a previous study focusing on examining the 
QVD-EM nexus in the banking sector is virtually non-existent. Third, the vast majority of 
QVD-to-EM studies have been devoted to investigating the context of developed economies 
(e.g., Francis, Nanda and Olsson, 2008; Husted and De Sousa-Filho, 2018; Lobo and Zhou, 
2001) with a little attention has been paid to bringing up contextual insights from developing 
economies settings. Our study contributes to the ongoing debate on the possible effects of QVD 
on EM in several ways. First, we extend the body of existing literature by developing a 
multidimensional framework to measure the quality of VD. Second, we add to the literature by 
considering the impact of the quality along with the quantity of VD on EM. Third, our study 
addresses the dearth in prior studies by examining the QVD-EM nexus in the banking sector. 
Finally, our research paper brings up new empirical evidence on the QVD-EM link from an 
under-research context, namely the MENA region, yet of a major economic and political 
importance to the global economy.  
Managers of institutions operate in the MENA region implement social accountability 
approach, which is associated with anti-manipulative behaviour, enhance the transparency of 
the disclosed information. Social accountability is considered as the institutionalised 
mechanism of control, which impacts both firm and individuals’ attitudes (Lassoued, Attia, & 
Sassi, 2018). Similarly, Brusca et al. (2016) indicated that directors of firms should disclose 
valuable information to be accountable to the society and enhancing their reputation in response 
to any potential outside stress performed by regulatory bodies. Since the full disclosure is 
linked to social accountability, society has the right to receive high-quality information 
regarding the company's operations. In the same manner, Haniffa and Hudaib (2002), conclude 
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that high-quality disclosure could assist directors in performing their accountability to society 
and helping stakeholders to take an accurate decision.        
Signalling theory argues that directors are motivated to reveal extensive information since 
accounting information is considered to be a signal to the capital market (Spence, 1973).  
Furthermore, signalling theory assumes that managers in the banking sector are very likely to 
used loan loss provision (LLP) as a signal instrument to transfer bank’s particular information 
to stakeholders, and therefore, send positive signals to stakeholders regarding their financial 
strength (Ahmed et al., 1999; Darjezi 2016). Based on the signalling theory, bank managers 
are tended to raise LLP to signal valuable information regarding their upcoming earnings, 
consequently, enhancing shareholders' confidence about the bank’s earnings (Ahmed and 
Courtis 1999). Banks with a low level of performance are expected to be involved in EM 
practices through decreasing LLP to increase the bank’s earnings. This approach could 
minimize the opportunity of being reviewed by regulatory agencies aiming to maximums 
management compensation. In this regard, Alhadab and Al-Own (2019) conducted a study that 
aims at examining the impact of equity incentives on earnings management using loan loss 
provisions (LLP) among 39 European banks. Their results show that managers of European 
banks widely use income-increasing earnings management by discretionary loan loss 
provisions, and that is partly motivated by the compensations of manager’s. The acceptably 
explanation of this argument is that managers are willing to send a signal that includes false 
information related to decreased or increased LLP to meet their expectations (Ashraf et al., 
2014).   
Besides, signalling theory suggests that accurate, complete, and reliable VD decreases 
information asymmetry between internal and external users (Katmon and Al Farooque, 2017). 
Since managers could reduce the asymmetric information by releasing high-quality 
information to the market (Miller, 2002; Watts and Zimmerman, 1990), it is expected that 
companies which provide QVD are less likely to be involved in earnings manipulation. 
Consequently, based on the results of previous studies that indicate a possibility of a negative 
association between QVD and EM (e.g., Rezaee and Tuo 2019; Katmon and Al Farooque 2017; 
and Alzoubi 2016; Lobo and Zhou 2001) and in the light of several of theoretical arguments 
primarily stemmed from Legitimacy theory and signalling theory, this study proposes the 
following hypothesis.  
H1: Ceteris paribus, there is a statistically significant and negative relationship 




3. Data and methodology 
The dataset used in our study was collected from banks listed in MENA stock exchanges and 
covered ten years period spans from 2006 to 2015 to ensure a consistent and adequate number 
of observations. The study started in 2006 due to the adoption of Basel II in 2005 across banks 
operate in MENA countries (Elamer et al., 2020). The selection of commercial banks in MENA 
countries is of a significance stemming from their considerable financial influence in the 
context of an emerging economy at large (Bourgain et al., 2012). For example, according to 
their credit levels and banking assets, MENA countries have been ranked second in terms of 
banking sector development (Ben Rejeb Attia et al., 2019). Similarly, banks operate in the 
MENA region have embraced Basel ii regulations that attempt to enhance the transparency and 
credibility of disclosed information Likewise, a series of reforms have been embraced by 
policy-makers in the majority of MENA countries to build a solid, institutional and legal 
framework which in turn attracts external fund and boost investors’ rights protection (Buallay 
et al., 2020). More specifically, enhancing the supervision, regulation and increasing 
transparency of banks are considered as a sample of the reforms that banks should undertake 
through imposing provisions for the information disclosed and implementing high-quality 
corporate governance mechanism that is in line with the international standards (Elfeituri, 
2018). In light of these characteristics, the banking system across MENA countries is heavily 
required by the adopted liberalization policies to improve the quality of reported financial and 
non-financial information in corporate annual reports (Kamla, 2007). 
Our data have been carefully collected from annual reports, the Orbis Bank Focus database, 
and the OSIRIS database to avoid any data unavailability and inconsistencies. The whole 
population of 149 listed commercial banks in MENA countries is used as the initial sample 
size. To ensure the generalisation of the study findings, we excluded those banks characterised 
with incomplete data, government banks, cooperative banks, Islamic banks as they have 
different regulatory requirements compared to commercial banks. We also filtered the sample 
by covering the period of Pre- and post-banking crisis and the adoption of Basel II in 2005 
across banks operate in MENA countries (Elamer et al., 2020). Thus, after applying the adopted 
sampling criteria, the final sample of our study is ended up with 106 commercial banks selected 
from 17 MENA countries with a total number of 1,060 bank-year observations. Table I presents 
the banks’ specifications by country. 
INSERT TABLE (I) 
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3.1 Measurement of EM 
Following the prior literature (e.g., Abdelsalam and El-Komi, 2016; Othman and Mersni, 2014; 
Elleuch and Taktak, 2015), we measured EM based on loan loss provision using Kanagaretnam 
et al. (2004) model. This model is a sector-specific approach and considered as the most reliable 
and robust approach in the banking industry that enables us to distinguish between non-
discretionary and discretionary accruals (Abdelsalam et al., 2016). Unlike other EM models, 
Kanagaretnam et al.  (2004) model utilise LLP that represents the largest portion of accruals in 
the banking industry (Lobo & Zhou, 2001) and plays a major role in the manager's decision to 
manipulate earnings (Beaver & Engel, 1996). 
Our study employed the following cross-sectional equation in the estimation of the 
discretionary part of LLPs: 
LL-Psit = β0 + β1 NP-Lit-1+ β2 ∆ NP-Lit+ β3 ∆ T-Lit+ εit            (A) 
This model consists of a non-discretionary component of loan loss provision (ND_LLP)1. The 
ND_LLP can't be directly achieved. However, it is obtained via the changes in the bank 
business condition. Following Kanagaretnam et al. (2004) and Kwak et al. (2009), we estimated 
ND_LLP through enclosing several variables that reveal the level of loan loss portfolios such 
as non-performing loans, total loans, and changes in non-performing loans. Therefore, 
ND_LLP is estimated by utilising the equation (A) and evaluation gained via its predicted (β0 
β1 β2 β3) coefficients (see equation B). The discretionary loan loss provision (D_LLP) relies on 
the predicted LLP estimation error obtained through the residual of equation (A). The final 
estimation process stage is to calculate the D_LLP through the difference between the 
estimated ND_LLP and D_LLP (See equation C).  In line with previous studies (i.e., 
Abdelsalam and El-Komi, 2016; Grougiou et al., 2014; Jackson., 2018), we used D_LLP as a 
proxy of earnings management as it is directly linked to managers decisions in manipulating 
earnings through underestimating or over-estimating LLP. 
ND_LLPit = β0ˆ+ β1ˆ NP-Lit -1 + β2ˆ ∆NP-Lit + β3ˆ ∆T-Lit              (B)  
D_LLPit = L-LPit – ND_LLPit.                                                    (C)  
where:  
 
1 For further information refer to Kanagaretnam, K., Lobo, G. J., & Mathieu, R. (2004). Earnings management to reduce earnings variability: 




LL-Psit: is calculated as total loan loss provisions for bank i at year t, divided by 
beginning total loans, NP-Lit-1: is the beginning balance of the non-performing loans for 
bank i at year t divided by the beginning, total loans, ∆NP-Lit: is calculated as the change 
in the value of non-performing loans for bank i at year t, divided by the beginning, total 
loans, ∆ T-Lit: is measured as the change in the value of total loans for bank i at year t, 
divided by the beginning, total loans, ND_LLPit: is the non-discretionary loan loss 
provisions for bank i at year t, D_LLPit: is the discretionary loan loss provisions for bank 
i at the year t. 
3.2 Measurement of QVD 
In the initial stages of conducting the current study, we adapted the disclosure framework of 
Beattie et al. (2004), which consists of the disclosure quantity and the spread. We then 
expanded this framework to capture three disclosure dimensions, which are (i) quantity (how 
much and what information is voluntarily reported), (ii) information disclosure spread 
(concentration and coverage of information), and finally, (iii) the usefulness of the disclosed 
information. Our expanded framework is based on these three dimensions and provides 
evidence regarding banks’ QVD, which allows both qualitative and quantitative features of the 
disclosed information to be captured. The following sections explain how each dimension of 
the QVD framework is measured. 
3.2.1 Quantity Dimension 
This dimension represents the VD amount that is adjusted by business size. Previous studies 
have suggested that disclosure levels are affected by business complexity and size (e.g., Beretta 
and Bozzolan, 2008; Platonova, Asutay, Dixon, and Mohammad, 2018; Rezaee, and Tuo, 
2019). Since our sample covers one industrial type (conventional banks), the quantity 
dimension (ST-R_Q) is measured by considering the variation in size of the banks to provide 
an effective evaluation of quantity VD. To capture the quantity of VD in annual reports, content 
analysis was applied. We constructed a checklist consisting of 88 items (see Appendix A). The 
selection and development of the categories for the classification of content is an important 
element of conducting a content analysis technique. Particularly, our study followed Menicucci 
(2013) and Maali et al. (2006) to develop a comprehensive checklist that contains items 
relevant to MENA banks. The number of words was employed to measure ST-R_Q in the 
current study. We used the relative number of words adjusted by bank size to capture the ST-
R_Q dimension since this external factor has been found to affect the level of disclosure. The 
standardised OLS estimation of the number of words (how much) on bank size was employed 
as the quantity dimension proxies. Following Beretta and Bozzolan, (2008), we obtained the 
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R_Qit by excluding the residual (estimated disclosure) from the actual total frequency of 
disclosed items. Then the maximum and minimum value of R_Qit form the overall sample are 
used to achieve the quantity dimension finally. We adopted the following standardised 
formula2: 
ST_ 𝐑_𝐐𝑖𝑡=    1 −  
𝐌𝐚𝐱 _𝐑_𝐐𝑖𝑡−  𝐑_𝐐𝑖𝑡
𝐌𝐚𝐱_𝐑_𝐐𝑖𝑡 −  𝐌𝐢𝐧 𝐑_𝐐𝑖𝑡
     
Where: 
ST_R_Qit = standardised relative quantity index for the bank i at year t. 
R_Qit = is the relative quantity index, which is the residual for the banks i at year t that 
obtained after controlling the size of the bank.  
3.2.2 The Spread Dimension 
The spread of VD is the second dimension used in this study since it helps to evaluate whether 
the voluntarily disclosed information meets the needs of various stakeholders. The functions 
of VD dispersion (DI_S) and VD coverage (CO) were used to determine the dimension of 
spread. We measured CO as the proportion of VD items reported by the banks in the annual 
reports from the total number of VD items contained in the index. The range of CO is between 
1 and 0. The highest value (1) is assigned if each of the topics (sub-topics) in the checklist is 
disclosed in the bank’s annual report, whereas the lowest value (0) is assigned with non-
disclosed topics. The following equation is used in measuring CO:   
COit =  
1
st
 ∑ IN_F𝑠𝑗=1  
Where, IN_F = 1 if bank i provides information in the annual report about item j and otherwise 
0, and s is the number of subcategories. We used DI_S as an indication of disclosed items’ 
concentration within the disclosure index. We also used the frequency of items disclosed from 
index A to obtain the concentration of disclosed items. This technique is adopted to examine 
whether bank managers focus (giving signals) on specific items or provide a variety of 
information about all items involved in the index. The following is the DI_S equation:  
DI_Sit =   1 − ∑  𝑛 𝑗=1   P-j
2 
 
Where P-j = proportion of disclosed item i measured by the item disclosure frequency in 
category j. In the current study, 0 is assigned as a value of DI_S if all VD words fall into one 
 
2 Further information about the measurement of quantity and spread dimensions can be found in Beretta, S., & Bozzolan, S. (2008). Quality 
versus quantity: the case of forward-looking disclosure. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 23(3), 333-376. 
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category, and a higher value is assigned when VD words are spread between categories. The 
quality of disclosure increases in line with the DI_S index value. Larger CO and DI_S indices 
indicate a higher information spread (SP_R). Thus, the average of DI_S and CO is used as a 
proxy for the spread dimension:  
SP_Rit =   
1
2
 (DI_Sit + COit) 
3.2.3 The Dimension of Usefulness 
Using the five fundamental qualitative characteristics of IFRS (2010): “comparability” 
“relevance” “understandability”, “faithful representation”, and “timeliness”, we have 
innovatively developed an index of disclosed items to measure VD usefulness. To evaluate the 
scores of each item, we employed rating scales with five points for all qualitative characteristics 
except timeliness, which was measured by using the natural logarithm of the number of days 
between the year-end and the auditor’s signature on the reported post-year-end calculation (see 
Appendix B). In line with Alotaibi and Hussainey (2016), we measured usefulness by using 
the weighted method as follows: 
US_EF =    
1
5
 ( Comparability +  Relevance + Understandability + Faithfulness +  Timeliness) 
Finally, the average of the three dimensions provides the quality of the information disclosed 
voluntarily. The QVD is defined as follows: 
QVD =  
1
3
  (ST_R_Q + 𝑆𝑃_𝑅 + 𝑈𝑆_𝐸𝐹) 
Several steps were taken to ensure the reliability and validity of QVD measurement. Firstly, to 
improve validity, we carefully developed our checklist based on previous studies. Secondly, 
the initial index was independently reviewed by four experts in the area of QVD, who offered 
their opinion on the ambiguities found in the review. To improve the reliability of our 
measurement, firstly, we used multiple coders to score the research instrument (Alotaibi and 
Hussainey 2016). We, secondly, discussed and resolved the discrepancies and any emerging 
problems accordingly. Thirdly, we used a sample of annual reports to compare the disclosure 
coding scores among coders. Fourthly, to validate the QVD model, we verified whether QVD 
is related to market reactions. Previous studies documented that the market reacts positively to 
QVD (Cahan et al., 2016; Nekhili et al., 2017), which signals the high quality of information 
disclosed by banks. Therefore, the market-based value (MBV) was employed to indicate the 
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market reaction; it is calculated using the aggregate of both earnings per share (EPS) and 
Tobin’s Q3.  
The untabulated findings of the panel data regression illustrate that QVD has a positive and 
significant association with MBV at 1 percent level, and the coefficient is equal to 0.1257. This 
finding suggests that a VD of high-quality information is more likely to help market 
participants to predict banks’ earnings in the subsequent year. Thus, we provide 
experimental evidence to support the validity of the developed framework. 
 
4. Empirical model 
Following prior studies, we used several control variables that may affect EM and QVD (see, 
e.g., Abdelsalam and El-Komi, 2016; Alotaibi and Hussainey 2016; Moumen et al., 2016; 
Nekhili et al., 2017). In particular, the following variables are considered: bank size, growth, 
leverage, profitability, liquidity, credit risk and capital adequacy ratio, external financing (L-
D), independent board of directors (I_BD), board size (B_Z), board expertise (BD_EX), duality 
(D_U), board gender diversity (B_GD), board meeting (B_M), independence of audit 
committee (I_AC), size of the audit committee (A_CZ), audit committee meetings (A_CM), 
the expertise of audit committee members (A_CEX), external audit (Big_4), gender diversity 
of audit committee members (A_CG), managerial ownership (M_OS), and block-holders 
(B_H). Following Abdelsalam and El-Komi (2016), a dummy variable is used to control 
country-specific effects. It is related to those countries that experienced political issues during 
the years from 2011 to 2015. A value of 1 is assigned if a bank is based in Tunisia, Egypt, 
Yemen, Syria, or Iraq and zero otherwise. Additionally, we used a dummy variable to control 
for the difference in economic environments among MENA countries. A value of 1 is given 
for Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and zero otherwise. We used the following 
model (1) to examine the effect of QVD on EM4: 
𝐸𝑀_𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(QVD𝑖𝑡;  Corporate Governanceit;  Bank characteristicsit + country effectsit)     (1)    
Following prior studies (Katmon and Al Farooque, 2017; Rezaee and Tuo, 2019), we utilised 
the Chow test to compare between panel and pool regressions. The untabulated result shows 
that F statistics is highly significant at 1% level, confirming the suitability of panel data 
 
3 Following prior studies, Tobin’s Q is measured as the market to book value of equity, whereas EPS is calculated as net 
income scaled by the total number of outstanding ordinary shares (Cahan et al., 2016; Nekhili et al., 2017).  
 
4 The Model Variables’ Definitions and Measurements are presented in Appendix (C) 
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regression. In the second phase, we used the Hausman specification test to compare between 
random and fixed effects regression, and we found the random effect is the most suitable for 
our sample as P value was insignificant (P= 0.1109). 
5. Results and Discussion 
From the descriptive statistics presented in Table II, the QVD standard deviation and mean 
values for the entire sample are 0.0530 and 0.5774, respectively and are consistent with those 
results reported by Michelon et al. (2015) and Lim et al. (2017), that suggest an averages value 
of QVD  varies between 56% and 57% among the UK and Australian listed firms, respectively. 
However, this finding is higher than those of Ghosh (2018), who reported that the level of 
disclosure is about 20% among MENA banks during the period 2000-2012. This discrepancy 
can be justified by the variance in the technique utilized to measure the disclosed information 
and to the investigated period as most MENA banks started adopting IFRS in post-2006 
(Elnahass et al., 2014).  The mean value of EM_LLPs is 0.1115, with a high degree of 
dispersion. Nevertheless, the findings show that the EM_LLP value across MENA banks is 
higher compared to those of Abdelsalam and El-Komi (2016), who reported 0.002 to be the 
average value of EM among MENA banks. The observed variation in the results of both studies 
may be attributable to the EM measurement differences. Unlike Abdelsalam and El-Komi 
(2016), we used the absolute EM value instead of using signed discretionary accrual value since 
the objective of our study is to examine the extent of EM and not the direction.  
The correlation among the independent variables is reported in Table III. The standard errors 
are likely to be inflated by the collinearity issue between the Big 4 and A_CEX, which may 
cause some variables to be statistically insignificant. In line with Gujarati and Porter  (2009), 
A_CEX was omitted due to the high level of correlation and less significant relationship with 
the EM proxy. The correlation coefficients of other explanatory variables are below the 
conventional threshold, meaning that the issue of multicollinearity among our study variables 
does not exist.  
5.1 Multivariate Analysis 
The main findings of our study are reported in Table IV and show a negative association 
between EM_LLP and QVD, which is in line with those of some previous studies  (Iatridis and 
Kadorinis, 2009; Lobo and Zhou, 2001; Sanjaya and Young, 2012; Tariverdi et al., 2012). Our 
result suggests that banks with high QVD are more likely to mitigate EM practices. This 
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evidence supports the contention that the increased level of transparency reduces asymmetric 
information expectations among stakeholders. This result supports the long-term perspective, 
suggesting that high QVD is provided by banks to minimise information asymmetry and boost 
owners’ confidence regarding firms’ future and current performance (Akisik and Gal, 2011). 
Furthermore, our outcomes are consistent with the perspective of signalling theory, suggesting 
that banks QVD mitigates information asymmetry by signalling superior performance to the 
information users (Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2008; Miller 2002). Thus, the current study accepts 
H1 that QVD has a negative impact on EM.  
In respect to MENA countries, our results appear to be well substantiated by those described 
by Ben Rejeb Attia et al. (2019) and Gerged et al. (2020), signifying that involving in any type 
of unethical practice such as EM may lead to imposing penalization by stakeholders, and 
therefore, bank directors are very likely to provide high QVD to mitigate any potential fine and 
to be recognised as ethically accountable. Noticeably, the quality of disclosure has 
spectacularly raised which could be attributed to the governments' role in most of MENA 
region to improve disclosure quality and due to the series of reforms adopted by policy-makers 
to set up a legal and institutional framework aiming to boost investor protection and attracting 
foreign direct investments (Kamla, 2007). Most importantly, banks in MENA countries are 
required to implement corporate governance codes to be in line with the internationally 
recognized standards. Therefore, implementing reforms and imposing provisions for the 
disclosure have dramatically improved supervision, regulation and transparency (Turk-Ariss, 
2009). In light of these characteristics, banks operate in the MENA region seem to be torn by 
the growing demand to promote disclosure quality, which is imposed by liberalization policy 
(Kamla, 2007). 
This outcome provides important implications for regulators and standard-setters, enabling 
them to continually improve the guidelines and framework to assist banks in providing high 
QVD. It also offers significant implications for bank managers in the MENA region by paying 
more attention to the quality of voluntary disclosure dimensions. 
INSERT TABLE (II) 
INSERT TABLE (III) 
Regarding control variables, we found a negative association between EM and the Big 4 
auditors, indicating that Big 4 audit firms are effective in constraining the occurrence of EM 
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practices of banks in MENA countries. This result corroborates the findings of Kanagaretnam 
et al. (2010) and Lin and Hwang (2010), who confirmed the negative impact of contracting 
with a Big 4 auditing firm on the engagement in EM. Furthermore, the B_H has a negative 
relationship with EM at the 1% level, indicating that banks with a higher B_H ratio found to 
have a lower level of EM. The result is in line with prior studies, which have shown that B_H 
with at least a 5% equity stake can play a key role in the mitigation of managerial opportunism 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Consistent with Ding and Zhang (2007) and Klein (2002), we 
found that B_H is negatively related to EM.  
Concerning bank characteristics, bank size (BSIZE) has a negative relation with EM. Previous 
studies  (Hadani et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2012; Lin and Shen, 2015; Scholtens and Kang, 2013) 
found similar findings as large-sized banks are less likely to manipulate their earnings figures 
as compared with smaller banks. This is due to an increase in the monitoring mechanism 
employed by regulators and their focus on potential EM-related issues (Kim et al., 2012). Also, 
the coefficients of growth and L_IQ have a negative effect on EM, implying that due to 
increased monitoring, banks with higher growth opportunities and greater liquidity are unlikely 
to engage in EM (Cornett et al., 2009). Furthermore, our results reveal that the external 
financing proxy (L-D) is negatively associated with EM, suggesting that managers manipulate 
earnings to attract external funds. They engage in EM by reporting low LLPs, thus decreasing 
the perceived risk and increasing the reported earnings (Othman and Mersni 2014). In contrast, 
the regression results reveal that none of the board characteristic variables, leverage, 
profitability, credit risk, and capital adequacy ratio, have any influence on banks’ involvement 
in EM in the MENA region. 
INSERT TABLE (IV) 
6. Additional analysis  
We check the robustness of the primary findings by employing the quantity of voluntary 
disclosure as an alternative proxy for QVD to examine whether EM is reduced or enhanced by 
using the new proxy. We argue that, despite the inseparable nature of the quantity and the 
quality of voluntary disclosure, the mere quantity evaluation of voluntary disclosure activities 
is unlikely to improve market decisions. Following prior studies, we used content analysis to 
measure the quantity of voluntary disclosure (QD) and repeated the main analysis (Belgacem 
and Omri, 2015; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). The findings of the additional analysis are reported 
in Table V. We found that the quantity of disclosure (QD) has an insignificant effect on EM 
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compared to QVD, which has a significant and negative influence on EM. Our findings support 
the main hypothesis, showing that it is the quality rather than the QD, which is very likely to 
enhance the financial reporting quality by reducing EM. 
INSERT TABLE (V) 
Furthermore, to achieve the confidence of our analysis that the main outcome does signify the 
effect of QVD on EM practice, we examine whether the influence of QVD on EM differs 
between the high QVD and low QVD banks. Using the median value of QVD, we split the 
sample into two sub-sets. The first sub-set consists of “high QVD banks,” whose QVD is above 
the median value, and the second sub-set is identified as “low QVD banks” with QVD below 
the median value. Table VI shows that banks associated with high QVD are less likely to 
engage in EM, although EM is insignificantly related to QVD in low-QVD banks in the MENA 
region. This means that high-QVD banks are less likely to manipulate their earnings figures as 
compared with low-QVD banks (Lin and Shen, 2015; Scholtens and Kang, 2013). This implies 
that high-QVD banks are mostly large-sized ones and facing stronger monitoring mechanisms 
employed by regulators to prevent their engagement in any potential EM-related issues (Kim 
et al., 2012). 
INSERT TABLE (VI) 
7. Robustness test 
Our study employs several alternative analyses to examine the robustness of our main findings. 
Firstly, we used an alternative EM measure to determine the robustness of the primary findings 
to various earnings manipulation measures. Specifically, we use Jones’ model, modified for 
banking institutions (Yasuda et al., 2004),  We estimated the total accruals (TO_AC) as the 
variation between net income and operating cash flows.  
TO_ACit = NE_Iit – OC_Fit 
Following Abdelsalam et al. (2016) and Yasuda et al. (2004), the cross-sectional variation is 
utilised. We used the non-discretionary of equipment and premises expenses alongside with 
the changes in operating income to measure non-discretionary accruals. And therefore, the 
residual from equation (D) is utilised as the discretionary portion of the total accrual since it is 
directly related to managerial discretion. In line with Abdelsalam et al. (2016), all variables are 














+ ε𝑖𝑡                   (D) 
Where:  
TO_AC= is the total accruals estimated from the difference between net income and 
operation cash flows. TO_A= Total assets. ∆ O_IN= Change in operating income. 
BP_E= Bank’s premises and equipment. Consequently, we repeated the main empirical 
analyses (see Table VII) using the alternative measure as a proxy of EM. 
 
The results are similar to the main findings in Table IV. This means that our primary results 
are robust to alternative EM proxies. Secondly, we tested the influence of each dimension on 
both measurements of earnings management separately. Table VIII reveals that the ST_RQ, 
which represents the quantity dimension of disclosed information, has an insignificant 
relationship in reducing EM in both models. On the other hand, the spread and usefulness 
dimensions of disclosed information have negative and significant associations in mitigating 
EM in both models. These results are supportive of the main outcomes and consistent with the 
argument that the quality of disclosed information is not directly linked with the level (quantity) 
(Beattie et al., 2004). However, the quality of information is more likely to be linked to both 
the spread and the usefulness of the disclosed information. Furthermore, we re-run the model 
without the additional explanatory variables, which might have influenced the main 
relationship between EM and QVD. The findings in Table IX support the main findings. It also 
confirms that the spread and usefulness dimensions are negatively and significantly attributed 
to EM, whereas, the quantity dimension has an insignificant association with EM. These results 
are corroborated with the debate that the quality of disclosed information is unlikely to be 
associated only with the level of disclosed information but also to the spread and the usefulness 
of this information (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008; Beattie et al., 2004). 
Finally, previous studies have suggested that managerial decisions affect both VD and EM, 
which will possibly lead to endogeneity issues (Harris et al., 2019; Rezaee and Tuo, 2019; 
Wang et al., 2016). Following Elnahass et al. (2018), we conducted the Durbin-WuHausman 
test to examine the existence of an endogeneity issue in our model. The findings of Durbin-
WuHausman is 0.5743. Although the endogeneity issue between the dependent and 
independent variable does not exist, the current study treated QVD as an endogenous variable, 
meaning that an endogeneity analysis will control the result. The current study used 
instrumental variable estimation (lagged QVD) to mitigate the endogeneity (Choi et al., 2013; 
Harris et al., 2019; Moumen et al., 2015). The two-stage least squares method was used to 
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reassess the key findings (see Table X). The outcomes are qualitatively in line with those results 
reported earlier in Table IV. Overall, our test confirmed the robustness of the main results and 
is not affected by the potential existence of endogeneity problems.    
INSERT TABLE (VII) 
INSERT TABLE (VIII) 
INSERT TABLE (XI) 
8. Conclusion  
This paper investigates the influence of QVD on EM among a sample of 106 commercial banks 
listed in 17 MENA emerging economies from 2006 to 2015. Two opposing viewpoints have 
been proposed by prior studies to explicate the association between QVD and EM. One view 
suggests that banks issue VD to reduce information asymmetry and uncertainty risk, thereby 
improving investment decisions in capital markets. The other view is based on the premise that 
the banks’ managers may disguise their opportunistic (EM) behaviour by disclosing more 
information voluntarily. One main gap that is not addressed by previous studies relates to the 
methods used to evaluate VD. Our study contributes to the extant literature by distinctively 
developing a multidimensional proxy for QVD and examining whether QVD can constrain 
EM. We combined three dimensions to measure QVD: the quantity, spread and usefulness of 
disclosed information. Using the OLS regression model, we found that QVD has a negative 
impact on EM. Our study adds to the ongoing debate on the possible effects of QVD on EM  
by providing new empirical evidence suggest that banks with QVD are, in fact, less likely to 
manipulate earnings, and instead will offer more transparent and reliable information in the 
context of developing economies generally and the MENA setting specifically. This evidence 
is in line with the perspective of signalling theory. Additionally, the influence of the quantity 
dimension of the disclosed information has an insignificant relationship in reducing EM, 
whereas, the spread and usefulness dimensions of disclosed information have a negative and 
significant association with EM. These outcomes support the argument that the quality of the 
disclosed information is not directly linked with the level (quantity) of disclosure, though the 
quality of information is more likely to be related to the spread and the usefulness of the 
information. 
This study offers several implications for bank managers, academics, and policy-makers. 
Firstly, it may help managers to appreciate the function and the importance of QVD in 
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mitigating EM. Secondly, for academics, our study provides suggestive evidence on the impact 
of QVD on EM; however, future research may need to consider the role of morality and ethical 
behaviour across different environments in reducing excessive risk-taking and constraining 
earnings manipulation. Finally, it provides insights for policy-makers and regulators to develop 
a framework or guidance that can help banks in providing high-QVD in the context of 
developing economies.  
Although our results are robust to various measurements and the possible occurrence of 
endogeneity problems, there are a few limitations that should be acknowledged, which provides 
opportunities for future research. For example, our sample size is relatively small due to data 
accessibility issues. Likewise, the findings of our research might not be appropriate for non-
financial sectors. These limitations provide a good opportunity for future studies to expand on 
our research by covering other developing economies and, thereby, enriching the understanding 
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1 Algeria 0 0.00% 
2 Bahrain 13 12.3% 
3 Djibouti 0 0.00% 
4 Egypt 5 4.7% 
5 Iraq 2 1.9% 
6 Iran 2 1.9% 
7 Israel 3 2.8% 
8 Jordan 12 11.3% 
9 Kuwait 8 7.6% 
10 Lebanon 2 1.9% 
11 Libya 0 0.00% 
12 Morocco 4 3.7% 
13 Oman 4 3.7% 
14 Qatar 6 5.7% 
15 Saudi Arabia 9 8.5% 
16 Syria 6 5.7% 
17 Tunisia 7 6.6% 
18 UEA 18 17% 
19 West Bank and 
Gaza 
4 3.7% 
20 Yemen 1 1% 
Total 106* 100% 
*Number of banks in the study sample which are 
listed in MENA countries and have complete data 




























Variables Mean Median S. D Min Max 
Dependent Variable 
EM_LLP 0.1115 0.1025 0.1299 0.0004 0.9970 
Explanatory variables 
QVD 0.5774 0.5750 0.0530 0.2380 0.7679 
I_BD 0.2899 0.3000 0.2672 0 0.9090 
B_Z 9.0150 9 2.9361 3 16 
BD_EX 0.7867 0.4530 0.4097 0.2857 1.00 
D_U 0.2476 0 0.4104 0 1.00 
B_GD 0.0143 0 0.0350 0 0.3333 
B_M 4.7216 5 2.3513 1 11 
I_AC 0.4869 5 0.4279 0 1.00 
A_CZ 3.0575 3 0.9478 2 6 
A_CM 4.5603 4 1.0252 4 11 
A_CEX 0.5462 0.5012 0.4980 0.3333 1.00 
BIG_ 4 0.5773 1 0.4942 0 1.00 
A_CG 0.0339 0 0.1812 0 0.3333 
M_OS 0.0441 0 0.1255 0 0.8590 
B_H 0.2976 0.2157 0.3151 6.68e-07 0.9838 
BSIZE 7.6594 3.2900 8.0071 0.0003 32.8636 
GWTH 0.1471 0.1247 0.1103 0.0001 0.9275 
L_EV 0.8522 0.8784 0.1291 -0.4179 0.9676 
P_ROF 0.4427 0.1726 0.4701 -0.4435 2.1250 
L_IQ 1.4554 1.1381 4.0767 -2.3924 87.5589 
CR 0.0308 0.0075 0.1591 -0.0915 4.1011 
CAP 0.1548 0.1218 0.1692 0.0071 2.3688 
LD 0.8324 0.8623 0.3889 0 4.8292 
GCC 0.5471 1 0.4980 0 1 








 QVD I_BD B_Z BD_EX D_U B_GD B_M I_AC A_CZ A_CM A_CEX Big_4 A_CG M_OS B_H Bsize GWTH L_EV P_ROF L_IQ CR CAP L-D GCC PT 
QVD 1.0000                         
I_BD -0.2223 1.0000                 
B_Z -0.0494 0.2689 1.0000                       
BD_EX -0.0841 0.4910 0.5513 1.0000               
D_U -0.0461 0.3275 0.4470 0.5761 1.0000              
B_GD 0.0876 0.0612 0.2323 0.2070 0.1149 1.0000             
B_M -0.0426 0.4794 0.3901 0.5509 0.3403 0.0326 1.0000            
I_AC -0.2773 0.6164 0.3195 0.5351 0.3332 0.0991 0.4854 1.0000           
A_CZ 0.0476 0.3816 0.4452 0.4303 0.2186 0.1661 0.5033 0.3560 1.0000          
A_CM 0.0159 0.3136 0.1239 0.2734 0.1374 0.0215 0.4572 0.3036 0.3467 1.0000         
A_CEX 0.0705 0.1953 -0.2129 0.0483 0.0138 -0.1395 0.1283 0.1204 0.0794 0.1415 1.0000        
Big_4 0.0466 0.2123 -0.1433 0.0769 0.0096 -0.1447 0.1701 0.1498 0.1386 0.1361 0.8927 1.0000       
A_CG 0.0674 0.1796 0.1818 0.0976 -0.0291 0.3101 0.0909 0.1379 0.3020 0.0245 0.0663 0.1182 1.0000      
M_OS -0.0225 0.1410 0.2037 0.0890 0.0883 -0.0834 0.1270 0.1688 -0.0063 0.0977 -0.1600 -0.1526 0.0116 1.0000     
B_H 0.0574 0.2233 0.2481 0.2552 0.1313 0.0116 0.3020 0.2001 0.3827 0.1197 -0.0276 0.0250 0.0273 0.0676 1.0000    
Bsize 0.1674 0.1419 0.0020 0.2204 0.1298 0.0514 0.1893 0.1256 0.0817 0.1250 0.3353 0.2752 0.1573 0.0600 -0.0023 1.0000   
GWTH -0.0927 0.0279 -0.1105 0.0248 0.0267 -0.0815 0.1185 0.0934 -0.0445 -0.0173 0.2772 0.2821 -0.0629 -0.0337 -0.0475 0.0839 1.0000  
L_EV 0.0755 -0.0571 0.0874 -0.0014 -0.0204 0.0832 -0.0559 -0.0787 0.0334 -0.0428 -0.2595 -0.2223 0.0546 -0.1334 0.0198 -0.0339 -0.4978 1.0000 
P_ROF 0.2930 -0.2368 0.1049 -0.0930 -0.0409 0.1032 -0.1368 0.2699 -0.2699 -0.0325 -0.0897 -0.2588 -0.2983 0.0189 0.0437 0.0861 -0.0856 -0.1361 1.0000       
L_IQ -0.0357 0.0823 -0.0206 0.0094 0.0106 -0.0280 0.0097 0.0568 -0.0149 0.0447 0.0526 0.0461 0.0152 0.1341 -0.0178 0.0282 0.0634 -0.4638 -0.4638 1.0000      
CR 0.0172 0.0485 -0.0544 -0.0469 -0.0517 0.0383 -0.0601 -0.0106 -0.0075 -0.0620 0.0584 0.0520 0.0183 -0.0281 -0.0483 -0.0055 0.1478 -0.1742 -0.0260 -0.0163 1.0000     
CAP 0.0749 0.0096 -0.0521 -0.1335 0.0026 0.0594 -0.0756 -0.0133 -0.0580 -0.0592 0.2296 0.2225 -0.0053 -0.0344 -0.1080 0.0556 0.0906 -0.1173 -0.0829 0.0040 0.2161 1.0000    
L-D 0.1582 0.0559 -0.0152 0.0734 0.0521 -0.0021 0.1238 0.0404 0.0410 0.0261 0.2382 0.2054 0.1075 -0.1630 0.1151 0.0916 -0.0314 0.1045 0.1603 -0.1332 -.0.693 0.0364 1.0000   
GCC 0.0707 0.1926 -0.2143 0.0489 0.0144 -0.1400 0.1273 0.1174 0.0793 0.1414 0.5981 0.6905 0.0661 -0.1605 -0.0302 0.3389 0.2874 -0.2682 -0.2599 0.0536 0.0581 0.2292 0.2352 1.0000  
PT -0.0170 -0.1464 -0.0452 -0.1845 -0.0217 0.0458 -0.1690 -0.1198 -0.1326 -0.1453 -0.5468 -0.4533 -0.0936 -0.0882 -0.0333 -0.3720 -0.1391 0.1508 0.1356 -0.0167 0.0062 -0.0765 -0.2676 -0.5479 1.0000 
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Table IV Regression result for the relationship between EM and QVD. 
EM_LLP  
Variables  Coef. Z P>|z| 
QVD -0.1042 -3.38 0.001*** 
I_BD 0. 0168 1.04 0.298 
B_Z 0.0014 0.94  0.346 
BD_EX -0. 0113 -1.14  0.252 
D_U -0. 0022 -0.20  0.840 
B_GD -0. 0483 -0.48 0.630 
B_M 0.0004 0.29 0.771 
I_AC -0. 0153 -1.57 0.117  
A_CZ 0.0053 1.33 0.183 
A_CM -0.0011 -0.33 0.739 
Big_4 -0. 0313 -2.69  0.007*** 
A_CG 0. 0233 0.88 0.380 
M_OS -0. 0116 -0.29  0.770 
B_H -0. 0407 -2.68 0.007*** 
Bsize -0.0026 -1.98 0.048** 
GWTH -0.1123 -4.08 0.001*** 
P_ROF -0. 0101 -1.15  0.251 
L_EV -0. 0331 -0.98  0.326 
L_IQ -0.0013 -2.45 0.014** 
CR 0.0176 1.17 0.241 
CAP -0. 0079 -0.44 0.661 
L-D -0. 0258 -3.12 0.002*** 
GCC 0. 0147 0.54 0.590 
PT 0.0324 1.13 0.259 
_Cons 0.2695 6.08 0.001 
R-sq: 0.1554, Prob > Chi2: 0.001 
***, **and * indicate the significance of coefficient at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels 



































































Model 2 Model 1 
QD   QVD 
Variables Coef. Z Coef. Z 
QD/QVD -0.0004 -1.50 -0.1042*** -3.38 
I_BD 0.0168 1.04 0. 0168 1.04 
B_Z 0.0015 0.97 0.0014 0.94 
BD_EX -0.0106 -1.07 -0. 0113 -1.14 
D_U -0.0037 -0.34 -0. 0022 -0.20 
B_GD -0.0350 -0.35 -0. 0483 -0.48 
B_M 0.0007 0.47 0.0004 0.29 
I_AC -0.0160 -1.64 -0. 0153 -1.57 
A_CZ 0.0049 1.23 0.0053 1.33 
A_CM -0.0011 -0.34 -0.0011 -0.33 
Big_4 -0.0308*** -2.65 -0. 0313*** -2.69 
A_CG 0.0180 0.67 0. 0233 0.88 
M_OS -0.0121 -0.30 -0. 0116 -0.29 
B_H -0.0382*** -2.49 -0. 0407*** -2.68 
Bsize -0.0025* -1.86 -0.0026** -1.98 
GWTH -0.1101*** -4.00 -0.1123*** -4.08 
P_ROF -0.0116 -1.11 -0. 0101 -1.15 
L_EV -0.0301 -1.04 -0. 0331 -0.98 
L_IQ -0.0013** -2.44 -0.0013** -2.45 
CR 0.0180 1.20 0.0176 1.17 
CAP -0.0097 -0.53 -0. 0079 -0.44 
L-D -0.0268*** -3.23 -0. 0258*** -3.12 
GCC 0.0162 0.57 0. 0147 0.54 
PT 0.0353 1.19 0.0324 1.13 
_Cons 0.2070 5.07 0.2695 6.08 
Model 2, R-sq: 0.1355 Prob > Chi2: 0.001                        Model 1, R-sq: 0.1554, Prob > Chi2: 0.001 
***, **and * indicate the significance of coefficient at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively.   
QD= quantity disclosure (total frequency of voluntary disclosure). 
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                    High QVD Low QVD 
Variables Coef. Z Coef. Z 
High QVD/Low 
QVD 
-0.2045*** -3.90 -0.0248 -0.40 
I_BD 0.0242 0.80 0.0025 0.16 
B_Z 0.0026 0.89 -0.0002 -0.15 
BD_EX -0.0412** -2.09 -0.0013 -0.15 
D_U 0.0104 0.47 -0.0092 -0.92 
B_GD -0.1048 -0.54 -0.0349 -0.39 
B_M 0.0018 0.50 0.0003 0.28 
I_AC -0.0477*** -2.66 0.0056 0.58 
A_CZ 0.0107 1.46 0.0021 0.52 
A_CM -0.0059 -0.84 0.0003 0.13 
Big_4 -0.0351** -1.99 -0.0268** -2.21 
A_CG -0.0064 -0.07 0.0180 0.93 
M_OS -0.0011 -0.02 -0.0270 -0.68 
B_H -0.0352*** -2.29 -0.0371*** -2.76 
Bsize -0.0024** -2.11 -0.0027*** -2.48 
GWTH -0.1644*** -3.27 -0.0306 -1.08 
P_ROF -0.0037 -0.23 -0.0087 -0.82 
L_EV -0.0507 -0.98 -0.0053 -0.11 
L_IQ -0.0017** -2.14 -0.0006 -0.48 
CR 0.0167 0.49 0.0072 -0.18 
CAP -0.0297 -0.49 0.0155 -1.14 
L-D -0.0159** -2.09 0.0885*** -5.67 
GCC 0.0181 0.52 0.0304 1.13 
PT 0.0292 0.89 0.0098 0.34 
Cons 0.3513 4.51 0.2296 3.24 
High QVD, R-sq: 0.1794 Prob > Chi2: 0.001                                  Low QVD, R-sq: 0.1629 Prob > Chi2: 0.001 
***, **and * indicate the significance of coefficient at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
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Table VII Results of panel data regression for the relationship between EM and VDQ 
based on modified Jones model 
EM_DA  
Variables  Coef. Z P>|z| 
QVD -0.0690 -3.54 0.001*** 
I_BD -0.0209 -2.11 0.035** 
B_Z -0.0023 -2.55 0.011*** 
BD_EX -0.0027 -0.43 0.664 
D_U -0.0074 -1.19 0.235 
B_GD -0.0343 -0.57 0.568 
B_M 0.0002 0.22 0.828 
I_AC 0.0079 1.31 0.189 
A_CZ -0.0052 -2.11 0.035** 
A_CM 0.0001 0.05 0.956 
Big_4 -0.0194 -2.62 0.009*** 
A_CG 0.0805 1.33 0.182 
M_OS -0.0095 -0.47 0.639 
B_H 0.0139 1.26 0.119 
Bsize 0.0003 0.20 0.841 
GWTH 0.0043 -0.25 0.805 
P_ROF 0.0084 1.56 0.120 
L_EV -0.0242 -1.36 0.175 
L_IQ 0.0003 1.00 0.361 
CR -0.0054 -0.56 0.576 
CAP -0.0020 -0.18 0.857 
L-D -0.0047 -0.93 0.354 
GCC 0.0103 0.98 0.325 
PT 0.0056 0.60 0.547 
-Cons 0.1241 5.13 0.001 
Random-effect method GLS regression,  
R-sq: 0.1181,  Prob > Chi2: 0.001 
***, **and * indicate the significance of coefficient at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels 













Table VIII Results of panel data regression for the relationship 
between EM and three dimensions of QVD  
 Model 1 Model 2 
 EM_LLP EM_DA 
Variables  Coef. Z P>|z| Coef. Z P>|z| 
ST_RQ -0.016 -1.160 0.188 -0.0173 -1.70 0.101 
Spread -0.812 -9.780 0.001*** -0.4438 -8.830 0.001*** 
USEFUL -0.033 -3.140 0.002*** -0.0392 -6.050 0.001*** 
I_BD -0.039 -2.560 0.011*** -0.0209 -2.220 0.026** 
B_Z -0.002 -1.040 0.299 -0.0019 -2.340 0.019** 
BD_EX 0.001 0.100 0.922 -0.0003 -0.050 0.957 
D_U 0.002 0.220 0.829 -0.0051 -0.900 0.368 
B_GD -0.020 -0.220 0.826 -0.0254 -0.460 0.648 
B_M 0.002 1.340 0.179 0.0005 0.540 0.586 
I_AC -0.005 -0.510 0.607 -0.0112 -1.940 0.052* 
A_CZ -0.006 -1.690 0.092 -0.0041 -1.870 0.074* 
A_CM 0.001 0.230 0.819 0.0002 0.110 0.911 
Big_4 -0.029 -2.680 0.007*** -0.0165 -2.320 0.02** 
A_CG -0.012 -0.520 0.603 0.0049 0.400 0.689 
M_OS -0.028 -0.780 0.433 -0.0135 -0.760 0.447 
B_H -0.016 -1.170 0.240 -0.0144 -2.060 0.039** 
Bsize -0.001 -1.140 0.256 0.0002 0.610 0.543 
GWTH -0.065 -2.530 0.011*** 0.017 1.000 0.317 
P_ROF -0.012 -0.440 0.661 0.0033 0.690 0.490 
L_EV -0.014 -1.540 0.124 -0.0157 -0.930 0.352 
L_IQ -0.001 -2.400 0.016*** 0.0003 1.010 0.314 
CR 0.011 0.800 0.421 -0.0036 -0.390 0.697 
CAP 0.006 0.380 0.705 0.0034 0.330 0.742 
L-D -0.029 -3.820 0.001*** -0.0065 -1.370 0.171 
GCC 0.037 1.690 0.09* 0.0186 2.030 0.043** 
PT 0.024 1.050 0.294 0.0053 0.700 0.482 
-Cons 0.483 11.960 0.001*** 0.1915 8.070 0.001*** 
Random-effect method GLS regression,  
R-sq: 0.3824,  Prob > Chi2: 0.001                                                 R-sq: 0.2237,  Prob > Chi2: 0.001 










Table IX Results of panel data regression without control variables 
  EM_LLP  EM_DA 
Variables  Coef. Z P>|z| Coef. Z P>|z| 
QVD -0.10672 -3.43 0.001*** -0.0618 -3.18 0.001*** 
ST_RQ -0.0083 -0.56 0.577 -0.0201 -1.85 0.121 
Spread -0.7837 -9.41 0.001*** -0.4289 -8.85 0.001*** 
USEFUL -0.0386 -3.66 0.001*** -0.0341 -5.46 0.001*** 




























































Variables Coef. z P>|z| 
Lag-VDQ -0.1048 -6.24 0.001*** 
I_BD 0.0176 -0.58 0.558 
B-Z 0.0015 -1.51 0.130 
BD_EX -0.0114 -2.83 0.005*** 
D_U -0.0025 0.24 0.813 
B_GD -0.0491 -1.28 0.200 
B_M 0.0004 -0.51 0.608 
I_AC   -0.0156 -0.61 0.543 
A_CZ 0.0054 1.63 0.103 
A_CM -0.0010 -1.34 0.180 
Big_4 -0.0316 -2.36 0.174*** 
A_CG 0.1263 1.21 0.227 
M_OS -0.0117 -0.47 0.636 
B_H -0.0409 -3.05 0.002*** 
Bsize -0.0026 0.54 0.592 
GWTH -0.1120 -3.57 0.001*** 
P_ROF -0.0101 1.96 0.050** 
L_EV -0.0333 -1.40 0.161 
L_IQ -0.0013 -0.85 0.398 
CR 0.0175 -4.25 0.001*** 
CAP -0.0078 7.20 0.001 
L-D -0.0258 -3.12 0.002*** 
GCC 0.0145 0.53 0.594 
PT 0.0322 1.12 0.262 
-Cons 0.2704 6.10 0.001*** 
*** **and * indicate the significance of coefficient at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels respectively.   




Checklist of Voluntary disclosure (VD) categories and items:  
1. Background about the bank / general corporate information (7):  
Brief narrative history of the Bank 
Basic organization structure / chart / description of corporate structure 
General description of business activities 
Date of establishment 
Official address / registered address / address for correspondence. 
The web address of the bank/email address 
Other background information 
2. Corporate Strategy (4): 
Management’s objectives and strategies / corporate vision 
Future strategy- general development of business. 
Impact of strategy on future results 
Other corporate strategy information 
3. Corporate Governance (18) 
Details about the chairman (other than name/title).  
Details about directors (other than name/title).  
Duties of board members. 
Number of shares held by directors. 
List of top five shareholders of the bank. 
Number of shares held by managers. 
Details of CEO’s contact address. 
Definition of independent directors. 
Nature of chairman of the board of directors. 
Directors’ engagement/directorship of other companies. 
Picture of all directors/board of directors. 
Picture of chairperson only. 
Information about changes in board members. 
The number of the board of members meetings held and date. 
List of the audit committee. 
Chairman’s statement.  
CEO's statement. 
Classification of managers as executive or outsider. 
4.   Accounting Policies (8) 
Accounting valuation of fixed assets (e.g., fair value or historical cost). 
The depreciation methods used. 
Foreign currency transactions. 
Events after the balance sheet date 
Disclosure of accounting standards uses for its accounts 
Statements of compliance with approved IFRS/IASs 
Treatment of contingent liabilities 
Other accounting policies  
5. Financial Performance (ratios) and other statistics information (16):  
A brief discussion of the bank’s financial position 
Disclosure on non-performing loans (NPLs) / Impaired loans 
Analysis of bank’s liquidity position 
Return on assets (ROA) 




Earnings per share (EPS) 
Capital adequacy ratios. 
Total dividends. 
Dividends per share for the period 
Number of branches extension during the current fiscal year. 
Financial statistics / financial highlights for more than one year  
Comparative Income statement for 2 years. 
Comparative balance sheet for 2 years. 
Cash flow statement 
A key achievement during the current year 
6. General Risk Management (7):  
Discussion of overall risk management policy 
Narrative discussions on risk assets, risk measurement. 
Discussion on how risk are managed and controlled.  
Information on the risk management committee.  
Information on assets-liability management committee.  
Information on the risk management structure. 
Other information on risk management 
7. Credit Risk Exposure (7):  
Disclosure on credit exposure  
Information on credit risk management structure 
Disclosures about the current loan.  
Details of a problem on loans and other assets. 
Disclosure of credit rating system.  
Disclosure about risk management process (use of risk-mitigating tools such as collaterals, 
guarantees, netting agreement, managing concentrations).  
Other information on risk exposure. 
8.  Currency and market Risk (4):  
They are broken down by assets and liabilities. 
Maturity of foreign currency assets and liabilities. 
General descriptions of market risk segments. 
Other information on market risk  
9.    Liquidity Risk Exposure (3):  
Information about the bank's available liquid assets as well as sources and uses of funds.  
Maturity information about deposits and other liabilities.  
Other information on liquidity risk 
10.  Key Non-financial Statistics (7):  
Details of branch location.  
Number of branches. 
Number of branch expansion during the year -2007.  
Information on branch computerizations.  
Information on ATM.  
Location of ATM and their address.  
Other non-financial information statistics 
11.   Corporate Social Disclosure (5):  
Sponsoring public health, sporting of recreational and social projects and education. 
Information on donations to charitable.  
Supporting national pride / government sponsored campaigns.  
Information on social banking activities / banking for the society.  
Other corporate social disclosure. 
12.   Employee information (6): 
Total number of employees. 
Number of employees trained. 
Policy on employees training. 
































Information on welfare of employees. 
Other employee information 
13.  Others:  
General voluntary disclosure information (e.g. On-line banking, international banking 
facilities, Information on credit card) 
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Appendix B: The Usefulness Dimension index  
 
 Depth of information disclosed Operationalization 
Relevance  
To what extent does the company 
use fair value instead of historical 
cost?  
1 = Only historical cost 
2 = Mostly historical cost 
3 = Balance fair value / historical cost  
4 = Most fair value 
5 = Only fair value 
To what extent does the presence 
of non‐financial information in 
terms of business opportunities 
and risks complement the financial 
information?  
1 = No non‐financial information 
2 = Limited non‐financial information, not very useful 
for forming expectations 
3 = Sufficient useful non‐financial information 
4 = Relatively much useful non‐financial information, 
helpful for developing expectations 
5 = Very extensive non‐financial information presents 
additional information which helps developing 
expectations 
To what extent does the risk 
section provide good insights into 
the risk profile of the company? 
1 = No insights into risk profile 
2 = Limited insights into risk profile 
3 = Sufficient insights into risk profile 
4 = Relatively much insights into risk profile 
5 = Very extensive insights into risk profile 
To what extent does the annual 
report contain forward- looking 
information? 
1 = No forward‐looking information 
2 = Limited forward‐looking information 
3 = Sufficient forward‐looking information 
4 = Relatively much forward‐looking information.  
5 = Very extensive forward‐looking information 
To what extent does the annual 
report contain information on 
CSR? 
1 = No information on CSR 
2 = Limited information on CSR 
3 = Sufficient information on CSR 
4 = Very much information on CSR 
5 = Very extensive information on CSR 
To what extent does the annual 
report contain disclosure of the 
extraordinary gains and losses? 
1 = No proper disclosure 
2 = Limited proper disclosure 
3 = Sufficient proper disclosure 
4 = Very much proper disclosure 
5 = Very extensive proper disclosure 
To what extent does the annual 
report contain information 
regarding employee policies? 
1 = No information regarding personnel policies 
2 = Limited information regarding personnel policies 
3 = Sufficient information regarding personnel policies 
4 = Very much information regarding personnel policies 
5 = Very extensive information regarding personnel 
policies 
To what extent does the annual 
report contain an analysis 
concerning cash flows? 
1 = No analysis 
2 = Limited analysis 
3 = Sufficient analysis 
4 = Very much analysis 
5 = Very extensive analysis 
To what extent are the intangible 
assets disclosed? 
1 = No disclosure 
2 = Limited disclosure 
3 = Sufficient disclosure 
4 = Very much disclosure 
5 = Very extensive disclosure 
To what extent are the “off‐
balance” activities disclosed?  
1 = No disclosure 
2 = Limited disclosure 
3 = Sufficient disclosure 
4 = Very much disclosure 
5 = Very extensive disclosure 
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To what extent is the financial 
structure disclosed? 
1 = No disclosure 
2 = Limited disclosure 
3 = Sufficient disclosure 
4 = Very much disclosure 
5 = Very extensive disclosure 
To what extent does the annual 
report contain information 
concerning the bank’s going 
concern? 
1 = No information concerning going concern 
2 = Limited information concerning going concern 
3 = Sufficient information concerning going concern 
4 = Very much information concerning going concern 
5 = Very extensive information concerning going 
concern 
To what extent do the reported 
results provide feedback to users 
of the annual report as to how 
various market events and 
significant transactions affected 
the company? 
1 = No feedback 
2 = Little feedback on the past 
3 = Feedback is present 
4 = Feedback helps understanding how events and 
transactions influenced the company 
5 = Comprehensive feedback 
Faithful 
representati
on   
To what extent are valid 
arguments provided to support the 
decision for certain assumptions 
and estimates in annual report? 
1 = No valid arguments 
2 = Limited valid arguments 
3 = Sufficient valid arguments 
4 = Very much valid arguments 
5 = Very extensive valid arguments 
To what extent does the company 
base its choice for certain 
accounting principles on valid 
arguments? 
1 = No valid arguments 
2 = Limited valid arguments.   
3 = Sufficient valid arguments 
4 = Very much valid arguments 
5 = Very extensive valid arguments 
Which type of auditor’s report is 
included in the annual report? 
1 = Adverse opinion 
2 = Disclaimer of opinion 
3 = Qualified opinion 
4 = Unqualified opinion: financial figures 
5 = Unqualified opinion: financial figures + internal 
control 
To what extent does the company 
provide information on corporate 
governance? 
1 = No description of corporate governance 
2 = Limited description of corporate governance 
3 = Sufficient description of corporate governance 
4 = Very much description of corporate governance 
5 = Very extensive description of corporate governance 
To what extent does the annual 
report contain disclosure related to 
both positive and negative 
contingencies? 
1 = No disclosure 
2 = Limited disclosure 
3 = Sufficient disclosure 
4 = Very much disclosure 
5 = Very extensive disclosure 
To what extent does the annual 
report contain information 
concerning bonuses of the board of 
directors? 
1 = No information concerning bonuses 
2 = Limited information concerning bonuses 
3 = Sufficient information concerning bonuses 
4 = Very much information concerning bonuses.  
5 = Very extensive information concerning bonuses 
Understand
ability 
To what extent is the annual report 
presented in a well organized 
manner? 
1 = Very bad presentation 2 = Bad presentation 
3 = Poor presentation 
4 = Good presentation 
5 = Very good presentation 
To what extent does the presence 
of graphs and tables clarify the 
presented information? 
1 = No graphs and tables.  
2 = 1‐5 graphs 
3 = 6‐10 graphs  
4 = 11‐15 graphs  
5 = > 15 graphs 
To what extent is the use of 
language and technical jargon in 
1 = Very much jargon 
2 = Much jargon 
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the annual report easy 
to follow? 
3 = Moderate use of jargon 4 = Limited use of jargon 
5 = No/hardly any jargon 
What is the size of the glossary? 
1 = No glossary 
2 = Less than 1 page 
3 = Approximately 1 page 4 = 1‐2 pages 
5 = > 2 pages 
To what extent does the annual 
report contain information 
concerning mission and strategy? 
1 = No information concerning mission and strategy 
2 = Limited information concerning mission and strategy 
3 = Sufficient information concerning mission and 
strategy 
4 = Very much information concerning mission and 
strategy 
5 = Very extensive information concerning mission and 
strategy 
To what extent is the annual report 
understandable in the perception 
of the researcher? 
1 = Very badly understandable 
2 = Badly understandable  
3 = Poorly understandable 
4 = Good understandable 
5 = Very good understandable 
To what extent are the notes to the 
balance sheet and the income 
statement sufficiently clear? 
1 = No explanation 
2 = Very short description, difficult to understand 
3 = Explanation that describes what happens 
4 = Terms are explained (which assumptions etc.) 




To what extent are changes in 
accounting policies disclosed? 
1 = No disclosure 
2 = Limited disclosure 
3 = Sufficient disclosure 
4 = Very much disclosure 
5 = Very extensive disclosure 
To what extent are changes in 
accounting estimates disclosed? 
1 = No disclosure 
2 = Limited disclosure 
3 = Sufficient disclosure 
4 = Very much disclosure 
5 = Very extensive disclosure 
To what extent does the company 
provide a comparison of the results 
of current accounting period with 
previous accounting periods? 
1 = No comparison 
2 = Only with previous year  
3=With 5years 
4 = 5 years + description of implications  
5 = 10 years + description of implications 
To what extent does the company 
present financial index numbers 
and ratios in the annual report? 
1 = No ratios 
2 = 1‐5 ratios 
3 = 6‐10 ratios  
4 = 11‐15 ratios  
5 = > 15 ratios 
To what extent does the annual 
report contain information 
concerning companies’ shares? 
1 = No information concerning companies’ shares 
2 = Limited information concerning companies’ shares 
3 = Sufficient information concerning companies’ shares 
4 = Very much information concerning companies’ 
shares 
5 = Very extensive information concerning companies’ 
shares 
To what extent did the company 
adjust previous accounting 
period’s figures, for the effect of 
the implementation of a change in 
accounting policy or revisions in 
accounting estimates? 
1 = No adjustments 
2 = Described adjustments 






How many days did it take for the 
auditor to sign the auditors’ report 
after book year end? 
Natural logarithm of amount of days  
1 = 1- 1.99 
2 = 2‐2.99 
3 = 3‐3.99 
4 = 4‐4.99  
5 = 5‐5.99 
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Appendix C: Variables measurement and definition  
 
Symbol Definition 
EM_LLP represents the extent of earnings management 
QVD stands for the quality of voluntary disclosure 
I_BD is calculated as the total number of independent directors scaled by the total number of board directors 
B_Z represents the size of the board 
BD_EX represents the proportion of board directors with financial expertise 
D_U is a dummy variable that takes a score of one if the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) has more than one role and zero otherwise 
B_GD represents the proportion of women board directors 
B_M is the total number of board meetings held in a financial year 
I_AC is measured as the number of independent directors on the audit committee scaled by the total number of audit committee members, 
A_CZ represents the size of the audit committee 
A_CM stands for the total number of audit committee meeting held in a financial year 
A_CEX  represents the audit members with financial expertise 
Big_4 is a dummy variable the takes the value of one if the largest four auditing firms audit the bank and zero otherwise. 
A_CG stands for the proportion of audit committee female members 
M_OS is the proportion of total shares held by managers scaled by the total number of outstanding shares 
B_H represents external stockholders with at least 5% of outstanding shares 
Bsize is measured as a natural logarithm of total assets 
GWTH is calculated as the change in total assets scaled by the lag of total assets 
L_EV is measured as total liabilities divided by total assets, 
P_ROF is calculated as net income scaled by the lag of total assets 
L_IQ is measured as current assets scaled by current liabilities 
CR is the credit risk and measured as the ratio of loan loss provisions scaled by total loans 
CAP represents capital adequacy ratio and is measured as the proportion of actual regulatory capital (Tier 1 capital) divided by the total 
assets 
L-D stands for external financing is measured as loan to deposit for bank i at the year t 
PT is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a bank is based in Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Tunisia, or Iraq and zero otherwise. 
GCC is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a bank is based in GCC and zero otherwise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
